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______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiffs, two health benefit plans (“Plans”), appeal the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Defendant, GlaxoSmithKline LLC (“GSK”), the manufacturer 
of the prescription drug Avandia.  The Plans brought suit 
against GSK under various state consumer-protection laws and 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 
U.S.C. ch. 96 (“RICO”), based on, among other things, GSK’s 
marketing of Avandia.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of GSK on the Plans’ claims, finding, in 
relevant part, that (i) the Plans’ state-law consumer-protection 
claims were preempted by the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. ch. 9 (“FDCA”); (ii) the Plans had 
failed to identify a sufficient “enterprise” for purposes of 
RICO; and (iii) the Plans’ arguments related to GSK’s alleged 
attempts to market Avandia as providing cardiovascular 
“benefits” were “belated.”  The Plans assert that the District 
Court erred in granting summary judgment, and we agree. 
 Applying the guidance recently provided by the 
Supreme Court in Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 
139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019), we hold that the Plans’ state-law 
consumer-protection claims are not preempted by the FDCA.  
With respect to their RICO claims, the Plans should have been 
given the opportunity to seek discovery prior to the District 
Court’s granting summary judgment on such claims.  Further, 
from the inception of this litigation, the Plans’ claims have 
centered on GSK’s marketing of Avandia as providing superior 
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cardiovascular outcomes—in other words, cardiovascular 
benefits—as compared to other forms of treatment, and 
therefore, the District Court’s refusal to consider the Plans’ 
“benefits” arguments was in error because those arguments 
were timely raised. 
 Therefore, for the reasons that follow, we will reverse 
in part and vacate in part the order of the District Court granting 
summary judgment in favor of GSK, and we will remand to the 
District Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
I. 
 In May 1999, the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) approved Avandia (Rosiglitazone), a drug developed 
by GSK, for the treatment of type-2 diabetes.  Prior to the 
development of Avandia and similar drugs, physicians 
primarily treated type-2 diabetes by prescribing metformin 
and/or sulfonylureas.  GSK, however, marketed Avandia at a 
much higher price point than metformin and sulfonylureas:  a 
one-month supply of Avandia cost approximately $220, 
approximately $140 of which typically was covered by 
patients’ health benefit plans, whereas a one-month supply of 
metformin or sulfonylureas cost approximately $50, about $45 
of which typically was covered by patients’ health benefit 
plans. 
 Despite this cost differential, health benefit plans—
including the Plans—placed Avandia on their formularies as a 
“covered” drug.  The Plans, for example, determined that it was 
advantageous to cover the cost of Avandia because GSK 
allegedly marketed Avandia as being capable of both 
controlling a patient’s blood sugar levels and reducing 
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cardiovascular risk, the latter of which is particularly pertinent 
to type-2 diabetes patients, 65% of whom suffer fatal 
cardiovascular-related illnesses or complications.  Metformin 
and sulfonylureas—the drugs that constituted the “standard of 
care” for type-2 diabetes prior to Avandia’s development—did 
not decrease cardiovascular risk, and therefore, according to 
the Plans, GSK presented Avandia as a cost-effective 
alternative to those drugs.  As a result, health benefit plans 
covered a large portion of the expenses related to patients’ 
prescriptions for Avandia, resulting in approximately $2.2 
billion in U.S. sales in 2006 alone. 
 In 2006, however, concerns arose that Avandia may in 
fact increase certain cardiac risks.  In August of that year, GSK 
submitted a Prior Approval Supplement to the FDA, in which 
GSK sought approval to add information to Avandia’s label 
regarding the results of a recent meta-analysis of various 
clinical trials.  The meta-analysis, “ICT-42,” demonstrated that 
use of Avandia was associated with a statistically significant 
increase in myocardial ischemic events—events during which 
the heart does not receive adequate oxygen because blood flow 
to it is reduced.  In May 2007, GSK submitted an update to its 
Prior Approval Supplement, offering a new formulation of its 
proposed warning with respect to myocardial ischemic events 
that would, among other things, make the warning more 
prominent and clear. 
 Three days after GSK submitted the update to its Prior 
Approval Supplement, the New England Journal of Medicine 
published a study authored by Dr. Steve Nissen  regarding 
Avandia (“Nissen Study”), in which Dr. Nissen concluded that 
Avandia “was associated with a significant increase in the risk 
of myocardial infarction and with an increase in the risk of 
death from cardiovascular causes that had borderline 
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significance.”  J. App. 1064.  Following the release of the 
Nissen Study, a representative of GSK held a telephone 
conversation with an official at the FDA regarding progress on 
the FDA’s review of the Prior Approval Supplement.  
According to GSK’s representative, who wrote a memo 
memorializing the details of the conversation, the FDA official 
advised that another official within the FDA was “calling for 
withdrawal of [the] approval” of Avandia, and thus, it was 
difficult for FDA officials to agree on labeling language for 
Avandia.  Sealed App. 655–56.  GSK’s representative then 
proposed implementing the labelling changes with respect to 
myocardial ischemic events through the Changes Being 
Effected (“CBE”) process, which permits a drug manufacturer 
to implement a change to its label prior to approval of such 
label by the FDA.  The FDA official “strongly advised against 
proceeding” through the CBE process, stating that doing so 
“may give legitimacy to Dr. Nissen’s data” and “will make 
people think that GSK must have other information.”  Id. at 
656.  The FDA official concluded the conversation by 
reminding the GSK representative that he “knew the 
regulations,” which state that the drug manufacturer is 
ultimately responsible for making the decision to pursue a 
labelling change through the CBE process.  Id. 
 On June 8, 2007, the FDA sent a letter (“Letter”) to 
GSK regarding the Prior Approval Supplement.  In the Letter, 
the FDA stated that it had “reviewed the data provided [by 
GSK in its Prior Approval Supplement] and f[ou]nd [that] the 
information presented [was] inadequate” and that, therefore, 
the Prior Approval Supplement was “not approvable.”  Id. at 
660.  The FDA stated that it had “concluded that the pooled 
data require[d] further analysis to adequately convey the 
potential risk for increased cardiac ischemia associated” with 
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use of Avandia.  In particular, the FDA stated that it had 
“identified certain subgroups of patients . . . that may be 
particularly vulnerable to experiencing an ischemic event” 
while using Avandia.  Id.  The FDA then directed GSK to 
provide additional information “to address the deficiency” in 
the Prior Approval Supplement, including “[d]ata from studies 
included in a meta-analysis performed by Dr. Steven Nissen 
published in the New England Journal of Medicine that were 
not included in [GSK’s] pooled analysis,” as well as data from 
various other clinical trials.  Id. at 661. 
The FDA expressed its view that the “potential risk of 
increased cardiac ischemia [was] a significant finding that may 
impact a large proportion of patients with type[-]2 diabetes,” 
and as a result, the FDA scheduled a joint meeting of two FDA 
advisory committees (“Joint Meeting”) “to discuss the findings 
from th[e Prior Approval Supplement] submission, additional 
data recently requested, and accruing information from 
ongoing clinical trials” of Avandia.  Id.  The FDA stated that 
the “outcome of th[e Joint M]eeting w[ould] be particularly 
germane to any labeling or other regulatory action needed for 
[Avandia] and should be factored into any resubmission to 
address the above deficiencies.”  Id. 
 Later in 2007, the FDA required GSK to implement 
various changes to Avandia’s label.  Subsequent to issuing the 
Letter, the FDA directed GSK to add a black-box warning to 
Avandia’s label with respect to the risk of congestive heart 
failure that (i) advised physicians and patients that Avandia 
“cause[s] or exacerbate[s] congestive heart failure in some 
patients,” (ii) instructed physicians to “observe patients [taking 
Avandia] carefully for signs and symptoms of heart failure,” 
and (iii) warned patients with certain heart conditions not to 
take Avandia.  J. App. 708.  Following the Joint Meeting, the 
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FDA additionally directed GSK to add a black-box warning to 
Avandia’s label with respect to the risk of myocardial ischemic 
events, advising physicians and patients that a “meta-analysis 
of 42 clinical studies . . . , most of which compared Avandia to 
placebo, showed Avandia to be associated with an increased 
risk of myocardial ischemic events such as angina or 
myocardial infarction” and that “[t]hree other studies . . . , 
comparing Avandia to some other approved oral antidiabetic 
agents or placebo, have not confirmed or excluded this risk.”  
Id. at 743.  The FDA also required GSK to include a longer 
explanation of the data with respect to the risk of myocardial 
ischemic events elsewhere on Avandia’s label. 
 Approximately three years later, in 2011, the FDA again 
directed GSK to revise the warning on Avandia’s label, 
including the black-box warning, with respect to the risk of 
myocardial ischemic events.  By that time, GSK had completed 
fifty-two (52) clinical trials.  The FDA’s required warning 
advised physicians and patients that “[a] meta-analysis of 52 
clinical trials . . . , most of which compared Avandia to placebo, 
showed Avandia to be associated with a statistically significant 
increased risk of myocardial infraction” and that “[b]ecause of 
the potential increased risk of myocardial infarction, Avandia 
[was] available only through a restricted distribution program.”  
Id. at 786.  In a memorandum accompanying its direction to 
implement the labelling changes, the FDA noted that the 
“evidence pointing to a cardiovascular ischemic risk with 
[Avandia] is not robust or consistent,” but that “[n]evertheless, 
there are multiple signals of concern, from varied sources of 
data, without reliable evidence that refutes them.”  Id. at 1397. 
 In November 2013, however, following the 
readjudication of a particular clinical trial (“RECORD Trial”), 
the FDA concluded that while “[o]ne cannot entirely discount 
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the results of the meta-analysis” that associated Avandia with 
a statistically significant increased risk of myocardial ischemic 
events, “the totality of the available evidence does not support 
a marked signal of cardiovascular harm.”  Id. at 1656.  The 
FDA determined that, following the readjudication of the 
RECORD Trial, Avandia “does not appear to be associated 
with an increased risk of major adverse cardiovascular events 
or death, although a small amount of residual uncertainty 
remains.”  Id. at 1657.  The FDA directed GSK to revise 
Avandia’s label “to reflect the current level of knowledge 
regarding [its] cardiovascular risk.”  Id. 
 In 2014, GSK revised Avandia’s label pursuant to the 
FDA’s direction.  GSK removed information regarding the 
restricted-distribution program from the label and information 
regarding the risk of myocardial ischemic events from the 
black-box warning only.  The revised label, however, 
continued to warn physicians and patients elsewhere on the 
label that “[i]n a meta-analysis of 52 double-blind, 
randomized, controlled clinical trials . . . , a statistically 
significant increased risk of myocardial infarction with 
Avandia versus pooled comparators was observed”—this 
information simply was no longer included in the black-box 
warning, but this warning nonetheless appeared elsewhere on 
the label.  Id. at 829.  Avandia’s label continued to include a 
black-box warning that (i) advised physicians and patients that 
Avandia “cause[s] or exacerbate[s] congestive heart failure in 
some patients,” (ii) instructed physicians to “observe patients 
[taking Avandia] carefully for signs and symptoms of heart 
failure,” and (iii) warned patients with certain heart conditions 
not to take Avandia.  Id. at 825.  These warnings remain on 
Avandia’s label to this day. 
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II. 
 The Plans brought suit alleging that GSK falsely 
marketed Avandia and concealed data with respect to its 
potential cardiovascular risks and side effects, thereby 
violating RICO and various state consumer-protection laws.  
The Plans assert that they would not have placed Avandia on 
their formularies if GSK had disclosed the cardiovascular risks 
that are in fact associated with Avandia.  In other words, the 
Plans would not have covered the cost of Avandia, which was 
considerably more expensive than alternatives, if they had 
known that Avandia not only did not reduce cardiovascular risk 
in type-2 diabetes patients but also increased cardiovascular 
risk as compared to those alternatives. 
 The Plans first filed suit in May 2010, and their cases 
subsequently were consolidated in a multi-district litigation 
case, which also included consumer and personal-injury suits 
filed by other plaintiffs.  In November 2010, GSK filed a 
motion to dismiss the Plans’ complaints, arguing that the Plans 
lacked standing to bring claims under RICO.  In October 2013, 
the District Court denied GSK’s motion, and, in October 2015, 
we affirmed the decision of the District Court on an 
interlocutory appeal.  See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices 
& Prod. Liab. Litig. (Avandia I), 804 F.3d 633, 646 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
 In May 2016, GSK filed a motion for summary 
judgment.  It argued that it was entitled to summary judgment 
because, among other things, the Plans’ state-law consumer-
protection claims were preempted by the FDCA and the Plans 
had failed to identify a distinct “enterprise” for purposes of 
RICO.  The Plans opposed the motion. 
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 In December 2017, the District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of GSK.  First, the District Court refused to 
consider the Plans’ arguments that GSK falsely marketed 
Avandia as providing cardiovascular benefits in comparison to 
alternatives because such arguments were “belated.”  Unsealed 
App. 4.  The District Court noted that the Plans “seemed to 
[have] shift[ed] their allegations to focus on Avandia’s 
benefits, rather than the risks,” and stated that it only would 
“address GSK’s motion for summary judgment as to [the 
Plans’] state law claims on cardiovascular risk.”  Id. at 3–4.  It 
stated that it would not “entertain” any of the Plans’ “benefits” 
arguments “at th[at] juncture” due to their “belated” nature.  Id. 
at 4. 
Second, the District Court found that the Plans’ state-
law consumer-protection claims were preempted by the FDCA 
under the doctrine of “impossibility” preemption.  It found that 
three separate facts established “clear evidence” that the FDA 
would not have approved a change to Avandia’s label with 
respect to cardiovascular risks:  (a) “the FDA rejected GSK’s 
[Prior Approval Supplement],” (b) “the FDA advised against 
using the CBE process to unilaterally change the label,” and (c) 
“the FDA ultimately concluded that there was no increased 
cardiovascular risk with Avandia use in relation to 
comparators.”  Id. at 24.  With respect to the Prior Approval 
Supplement, the District Court found that the “rejection of 
GSK’s proposed label on the basis of inconclusive data, 
considered with other evidence, constitutes clear evidence that 
the FDA would not have approved the label change . . . , 
particularly where . . . the FDA wanted to conduct further 
review of the data.”  Id. at 24–25.  Regarding the FDA’s 
advising against using the CBE process, the District Court 
found that an FDA representative’s statements—that she 
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“strongly advised” against using the CBE process and that 
initializing that process would be “looked on with suspicion” 
and would “pull the rug out” from the FDA’s then-current 
plans for reviewing Avandia’s label—“shows that the FDA 
advised against using [the] CBE [process] to make the 
proposed label change prior to November 2007.”  Id. at 25.  
Finally, the District Court placed an emphasis on the FDA’s 
“remov[al of] the black[-]box warning and restricted[-]access 
information from Avandia’s label,” as well as the FDA’s 
“current conclusion that a link between Avandia use and 
increased cardiovascular risk does not exist.”  Id. at 26.  In 
summary, the District Court found that the “FDA would not 
have approved of a warning for increased cardiovascular risk 
in Avandia versus competitors earlier than 2007 . . . and would 
not approve one now.”  Id. 
Third, the District Court concluded that the Plans failed 
to identify an “enterprise” that satisfies the “distinctiveness” 
requirement of RICO.  Specifically, it determined that “GSK 
was conducting its own business in selling Avandia, and thus . 
. . GSK is both the person and the enterprise.”  Id. at 16.  
Because “RICO liability ‘depends on showing that the 
defendants conducted or participated in the conduct of the 
enterprise’s affairs, not just their own affairs,’” the District 
Court found that the Plans had not adequately alleged that an 
“enterprise” existed because they merely alleged that the 
“enterprise” in this case consisted of “GSK and its agents.”  Id. 
(emphasis in original) (quoting Reeves v. Ernst & Young, 507 
U.S. 170, 185 (1993)). 
The Plans timely appealed.  They also appealed two 
orders of the District Court that maintained the vast majority 
of the summary-judgement record under seal.  We considered 
that appeal in In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. 
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Liab. Litig. (Avandia II), 924 F.3d 662, 680 (3d Cir. 2019), in 
which we vacated the District Court’s sealing orders. 
III. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332(d), and we have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a district 
court’s grant of summary judgment.  Reedy v. Evanson, 615 
F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2010).  When a district court grants 
summary judgment without considering a declaration filed by 
the nonmoving party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(d), however, we review for abuse of discretion the district 
court’s decision to disregard the Rule 56(d) declaration.  
Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 568 (3d Cir. 2015). 
A. 
 With the benefit of the Supreme Court’s recent 
guidance in Merck, which was decided following oral 
argument in this case and well after the District Court’s 
issuance of its memorandum opinion,1 we hold that the Plans’ 
state-law consumer-protection claims are not preempted by the 
FCDA, and we therefore will reverse the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment in favor of GSK on such claims. 
 In Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 570–71 (2009), the 
Supreme Court recognized that “it has remained a central 
premise of federal drug regulation that the manufacturer [of a 
pharmaceutical] bears responsibility for the content of its label 
                                              
1 We subsequently ordered the parties to submit supplemental 
letter briefs discussing Merck’s effect, if any, on the disposition 
of this case.  
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at all times” and that the manufacturer “is charged both with 
crafting an adequate label and with ensuring that its warnings 
remain adequate as long as the drug is on the market.”  Thus, 
when it “bec[o]me[s] apparent” that a drug poses a certain risk 
to the health and safety of persons taking it, the manufacturer 
of the drug “ha[s] a duty to provide a warning that adequately 
describe[s] that risk.”  Id. at 571.  The manufacturer may warn 
persons of that risk by altering the drug’s label through the 
CBE process, which “permit[s] it to provide such a warning 
before receiving the FDA’s approval.”  Id. 
 Under the FDCA, however, the FDA “retains authority 
to reject labeling changes made pursuant to the CBE regulation 
in its review of the manufacturer’s supplemental application, 
just as it retains such authority in reviewing all supplemental 
applications.”  Id.  Therein lies the conflict that may give rise 
to impossibility preemption:  even though a drug manufacturer 
has the responsibility under state consumer-protection laws to 
accurately label a drug and may change the label pursuant to 
the CBE process prior to receiving approval from the FDA, it 
may reject a label change at any time if it considers the drug to 
be “mislabeled” under the FDCA.  Thus, a situation may occur 
in which a drug company seeks to change its label to add a 
warning that it believes is required by state consumer-
protection laws, but the FDA considers the drug “mislabeled” 
under the FDCA in light of the new warning that was added to 
the label.  In that situation, it would be impossible to comply 
with both state and federal law.  In resolving this conflict, the 
Supreme Court struck a balance in Wyeth, holding that the 
FDCA does not preempt state-law consumer-protection claims 
regarding the labeling of a drug “absent clear evidence that the 
FDA would not have approved a change to [the drug]’s label.”  
Id. 
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 After we indicated in In re Fosamax (Alendronate 
Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852 F.3d 268, 284 (3d Cir. 2017), 
vacated, Merck, 139 S. Ct. 1668, that it would be helpful for 
the Supreme Court to “clarif[y] or buil[d] out the doctrine” 
espoused in Wyeth, the Supreme Court provided such 
interpretive guidance in Merck.  “[C]lear evidence,” as used in 
Wyeth’s core holding, means “evidence that shows the court 
that the drug manufacturer fully informed the FDA of the 
justifications for the warning required by state law and that the 
FDA, in turn, informed the drug manufacturer that the FDA 
would not approve a change to the drug’s label to include that 
warning.”  139 S. Ct. at 1672.  Thus, to “show[] that federal 
law prohibited [a] drug manufacturer from adding a warning 
that would satisfy state law,” the drug manufacturer must 
demonstrate that (1) “it fully informed the FDA of the 
justifications for the warning required by state law” and (2) 
“the FDA, in turn, informed the drug manufacturer that the 
FDA would not approve changing the drug’s label to include 
that warning.”  Id. at 1678. 
 GSK has failed to satisfy either prong of Merck’s two-
prong test, and it therefore is not “entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  First, GSK has not 
shown that “it fully informed the FDA of the justifications for 
the warning required by state law.”  Merck, 139 S. Ct. at 1678.  
In the Letter, the FDA itself stated that it had “reviewed the 
data provided [by GSK] and f[ou]nd [that] the information 
presented is inadequate.”  Sealed App. 660 (emphasis added).  
Further, the FDA indicated that GSK needed to submit various 
data and information “in order to address the deficiency of this 
application.”  Id. at 661.  Thus, GSK cannot demonstrate that 
the FDA was “fully informed . . . of the justifications for the 
warning,” Merck, 139 S. Ct. at 1678, because the FDA itself 
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stated that it was “inadequate[ly]” informed of the 
justifications for the warning, Sealed App. 660. 
 GSK argues that it “fully informed” the FDA because 
GSK (1) provided all “material” information to the FDA and 
(2) did not have access to the information that the FDA 
requested until after the latter issued the Letter, but these 
arguments are unavailing.  GSK concedes that the FDA 
requested additional data and information in the Letter, yet 
GSK argues that none of the data and information that the FDA 
actually requested in the Letter was “material” to its proposed 
warning on cardiac risk, and that therefore, the FDA was “fully 
informed” for purposes of Merck.  This argument turns the 
regulatory regime on its head.  The FDA, not GSK, is the entity 
with power to approve or refuse a change to a drug’s label, and 
in making such a decision, it has the statutory authority to 
conclude that the data and tests submitted by a manufacturer 
were not “adequate” or that there is “insufficient information 
about the drug to determine whether the product is safe for use 
under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in 
its proposed labeling.”  21 C.F.R. §§ 314.125(b)(2), (4).  GSK 
is not the arbiter of which data and information is or is not 
“material” to the FDA’s decision to approve or reject a change 
to a drug’s label—the FDA, and only the FDA, can determine 
what information is “material” to its own decision to approve 
or reject a labelling change. 
 Additionally, by arguing that it did not have access to 
the FDA’s requested data and information until after the FDA’s 
issuance of the Letter, GSK undermines its own argument that 
the FDA was “fully informed.”  Merck noted that “a drug 
manufacturer will not ordinarily be able to show that there is 
an actual conflict between state and federal law such that it was 
impossible to comply with both.”  139 S. Ct. at 1679.  Thus we 
18 
 
read Merck as holding that, in order to prove impossibility 
preemption, the drug manufacturer must show that the “FDA 
would not approve changing the drug’s label” and that the FDA 
was “fully informed . . . of the justifications for the [proposed] 
warning” at the time that the FDA rejected the proposed 
warning.  Id. at 1678.  In other words, the upshot of Merck is 
that a drug manufacturer must show that the FDA made a fully 
informed decision to reject a change to a drug’s label in order 
to establish the “demanding defense” of impossibility 
preemption.  Id. at 1678.  If the question of whether the FDA 
was “fully informed” was not tethered in time to the question 
of whether the FDA indeed rejected the proposed warning, the 
“fully informed” prong of the test espoused in Merck would be 
rendered superfluous. 
Thus, if GSK wishes to rely on the Letter as proof that 
the FDA rejected its proposed label change, it must also 
demonstrate that the FDA possessed all the information it 
deemed necessary to decide whether to approve or reject the 
proposed warning at the time it issued the Letter.  By arguing 
that it did not have the FDA’s requested data and information 
until after the FDA issued its letter, however, GSK is, in effect, 
conceding that the FDA was not “fully informed” at the time 
of the Letter’s issuance.  For that reason, among the others 
outlined above, GSK cannot satisfy the first prong of the test 
espoused in Merck. 
Second, GSK cannot show that the “FDA . . . informed 
[it] that the FDA would not approve changing the drug’s label 
to include [the relevant] warning.”  Id. at 1678.  GSK directs 
the Court’s attention to the Letter as proof that the FDA 
rejected the proposed warning.  The Letter indeed stated that 
GSK’s Prior Approval Supplement for a label change was “not 
approvable,” but the FDA indicated that this was so because 
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the “information presented [by GSK wa]s inadequate.”  Sealed 
App. 660.  The FDA then required GSK to “amend the 
supplemental application,” stating that “[a]ny amendment 
should respond to all the deficiencies listed” in the Letter.  Id. 
at 661 (emphasis added).  Thus, it is clear from the very text of 
the Letter that the FDA did not consider GSK’s Prior Approval 
Supplement “not approvable” because it was unconvinced of 
the need for a strong warning on myocardial ischemic events; 
rather, the FDA considered the Prior Approval Supplement 
“not approvable” because it contained various “deficiencies” 
that the FDA required GSK to ameliorate prior to the FDA’s 
making a final determination.  At most, the Letter indicates that 
it is possible that the FDA could have rejected the label change 
after receiving the various data and information it requested 
from GSK, but as the Supreme Court has reiterated, the 
“possibility of impossibility [is] not enough.”  Merck, 139 S. 
Ct. at 1678 (alteration in original) (quoting PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 625 n.8 (2011)).  We nevertheless need 
not speculate regarding the possibility that the FDA would 
have rejected the proposed warning upon the receipt of the 
requested data and information because it indeed ordered GSK 
to include various warnings regarding cardiac risks on 
Avandia’s label shorty after issuing the Letter, which alone 
undermines GSK’s position that the Letter represents a 
rejection of its proposed warning. 
Finally, we are not persuaded by any of GSK’s 
arguments that the Plans’ claims are preempted because GSK 
allegedly was unable to avail itself of the CBE process for 
various reasons.  GSK primarily argues that it could not use the 
CBE process to introduce a warning on ischemic risks prior to 
mid-2006, when it submitted its Prior Approval Supplement.  
GSK reasons that ICT-42 served as the basis for its belief that 
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an ischemic-risk warning should be included on the label, and 
because that study was completed in mid-2006, it did not have 
the “newly acquired information” necessary to make a labeling 
change prior to that time.  This argument, however, is 
undermined by GSK’s own admissions.  For example, GSK 
itself described the results of “ICT-37,” a meta-analysis 
completed a year earlier in August 2005, as “generally similar” 
to ICT-42, and GSK stated that “[a]ny numerical differences 
[between the meta-analyses] were not clinically significant.” 
Sealed App. 861. Thus, at the very least, it appears that GSK 
could have used the CBE process to add an ischemic-risk 
warning as early as August 2005 because, by GSK’s own 
admission, ICT-37 and ICT-42 indicated similar results and 
had clinically insignificant numerical differences.2  Further, 
GSK cannot rely on its informal phone conversations with an 
FDA official to claim that it could not pursue a label change 
through the CBE process, nor can GSK rely on the stock 
language at the end of the Letter, which advised GSK that 
Avandia “may be considered to be misbranded under the 
[FDCA] if it is marketed with the[ proposed] changes before 
approval of this supplemental application.”  Id. at 661.  An 
informal phone conversation with an FDA official is not an 
“agency action taken pursuant to the FDA’s congressionally 
delegated authority,” Merck, 139 S. Ct. at 1679, and the stock 
language at the end of the Letter is a simple statement of the 
law:  if a manufacturer makes a label change pursuant to the 
CBE process (i.e., without seeking the prior approval of the 
FDA), the manufacturer always runs the risk that the FDA will 
                                              
2 We take no position with respect to whether GSK could have 
used the CBE process, or otherwise sought to change 
Avandia’s label, to add an ischemic-risk warning prior to 
August 2005. 
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later reject the label change and consider the drug as 
“mislabeled,” see 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(7).  Finally, GSK’s 
argument that it could not implement a black-box warning 
through the CBE process is a red herring—the Plans are not 
arguing that GSK should have added the black box itself 
through the CBE process, but rather that GSK should have 
added the content of the black-box warning anywhere on the 
label. 
GSK thus has failed to demonstrate that the Plans’ state-
law consumer-protection claims are preempted by the FDCA, 
and GSK therefore is not entitled to summary judgment on 
those grounds.  Therefore, we will reverse the order of the 
District Court granting summary judgment in favor of GSK on 
the Plans’ state-law consumer-protection claims. 
B. 
 The District Court erred in granting summary judgment 
on the Plans’ RICO claims without giving the Plans the benefit 
of discovery on those claims. 
 “[A] Court ‘is obligated to give a party opposing 
summary judgment an adequate opportunity to obtain 
discovery.’”  Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 257 
(3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 
F.2d 136, 139 (3d Cir. 1988)).  “If discovery is incomplete, a 
district court is rarely justified in granting summary judgment, 
unless the discovery request pertains to facts that are not 
material to the moving party’s entitlement to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Shelton, 775 F.3d at 568. 
Rule 56(d) provides that “[i]f a nonmovant shows by 
affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot 
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present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may:  
(1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to 
obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) 
issue any other appropriate order.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).  
“[D]istrict courts usually grant properly filed requests for 
discovery under Rule 56(d) ‘as a matter of course’ . . . .”  
Shelton, 775 F.3d at 568 (quoting Murphy v. Millennium Radio 
Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 309–10 (3d Cir. 2011)).  “This is 
particularly true when there are discovery requests outstanding 
or where relevant facts are under control of the party moving 
for summary judgment.”  Id.  A district court abuses its 
discretion when it grants summary judgment in favor of the 
moving party “without even considering” a Rule 56(d) 
declaration filed by the nonmoving party.  See id. 
 The Plans never received discovery related to their 
RICO claims, including with respect to whether an “enterprise” 
existed for purposes of RICO, and thus when GSK moved for 
summary judgment on the Plans’ RICO claims, the Plans 
submitted a detailed Rule 56(d) declaration regarding the lack 
of discovery on the issues related to RICO.  See J. App. 2195–
2198.  They subsequently filed a supplemental Rule 56(d) 
declaration, further elaborating on their need for discovery on 
RICO-related issues.  See id. at 2272–76. 
 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor 
of GSK on the Plans’ RICO claims without considering their 
Rule 56(d) declaration and their supplemental Rule 56(d) 
declaration.  This was an abuse of discretion, especially as the 
District Court granted summary judgment on the ground that 
the Plans could not prove the existence of an “enterprise,” 
information related to which is “under control of the party 
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moving for summary judgment”—in this case, GSK.3  Shelton, 
775 F.3d at 568.  We therefore vacate the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment in favor of GSK on the Plans’ 
RICO claims, and we remand to the District Court to give 
proper consideration to the Plans’ Rule 56(d) declarations. 
IV. 
 Finally, we note that, on remand, the District Court must 
consider the Plans’ arguments that GSK marketed Avandia as 
providing cardiovascular benefits.  These arguments and 
claims are not “belated”; the Plans have pursued this line of 
argument since the outset of this litigation.   In the Plans’ 
complaint itself, the Plans alleged that they “rel[ied] upon 
[GSK]’s promises of superior treatment and better 
cardiovascular outcomes compared with the older diabetes 
drugs” in determining that it was worth the increased cost to 
cover Avandia.  J. App. 1273.  They alleged that “better 
cardiovascular outcomes” were a crucial part of GSK’s alleged 
fraudulent marketing:  “[t]he notion that Avandia would 
actually lower diabetics’ cardiovascular risk was critical to 
Avandia’s marketing” because GSK “needed justification for 
the steep price difference between Avandia and the older 
established diabetes drugs.”  Id. at 1291.  While a portion of 
the Plans’ claims center on the assertion that GSK should have 
disclosed on its label the true nature of the increased 
cardiovascular risk that was presented by Avandia as compared 
to cheaper alternatives, the increased risk is only relevant to the 
                                              
3 We refuse to construe the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of GSK on the Plans’ RICO claims as a 
dismissal on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), particularly 
because the Plans’ RICO claims previously survived a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  See Avandia I, 804 F.3d at 646. 
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Plans’ claims insofar as the Plans make the following 
argument:  GSK failed to warn of Avandia’s true 
cardiovascular risk, and thus, GSK was continuing—by 
omission—to promote Avandia as capable of lowering 
patients’ cardiovascular risk, and GSK thereby continued to 
induce the Plans to cover the cost of Avandia based on this 
perceived “benefit” of lowering cardiovascular risk.  Id. at 
1316.  In short, the Plans have never argued that GSK 
promoted Avandia as capable of actually improving patients’ 
cardiovascular health, but rather as capable of lowering 
cardiovascular risk when compared to cheaper alternatives, 
which indeed is a “benefit.” 
 Because the Plans have raised, throughout these 
proceedings, arguments that GSK marketed Avandia as 
providing cardiovascular benefits, it was error for the District 
Court to refuse to consider those arguments.  See, e.g., Hillman 
v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 66 F.3d 141, 144 (7th Cir. 1995).  
Therefore, on remand, the District Court needs to give proper 
consideration to these arguments. 
V. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will reverse the order 
of the District Court granting summary judgment in favor of 
GSK on the Plans’ state-law consumer-protection claims, 
vacate the order of the District Court granting summary 
judgment in favor of GSK on the Plans’ RICO claims, and 
remand to it for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  On 
remand, the District Court shall give proper consideration to 
the Plans’ Rule 56(d) declarations, as well as their arguments 
that GSK marketed Avandia as providing cardiovascular 
benefits. 
